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At the beginning of Freud and the Scene of Writing Derrida announced the way he would 
use Freud: “to locate in Freud’s texts (…) those elements of psychoanalysis which can 
only uneasily be contained within logocentric closure” (Derrida, 1978, p. 249). In this 
paper I want to take over Derrida’s reading angle under the form of a question: the 
question of what escapes the logos in Freud’s work? 
I tackle this question at two different levels: 
1. The level of Freud’s model: in Freud’s model of the psyche what are the modes of 
functioning that cannot be verbalized?  
2. The level of Freud’s formulation: in Freud’s writings what is not exclusively 
formalized under a verbal form? 
In the first part I identify within the hypothesis that Freud imagined to describe the 
genesis of the psyche: a primary hallucinatory mode of thinking and a secondary verbal 
mode of thinking. I try to show how the creation of unconscious presentations by the 
hallucinatory mode of thinking operates beyond the logos. Moreover I propose that 
meaning produced by the verbal mode of thinking covers and hides the hallucinatory 
mode of thinking, which would constitute a form of functioning of repression. In the 
second part I try to define the ways Freud invented a form of writing in order to model 
hallucinatory modes of thinking. I propose to name metapsychological writing this form 
of writing that uses scientific formulations, graphics, analogies and myths. I argue that 
what is at stake in the invention of a metapsychological writing is the creation of a 




The question I would like to raise in this paper comes from Jacques Derrida. With Of 
Grammatology Derrida undertook one of his main philosophical endeavours: to challenge 
what makes objectivity possible, “the originary constitution of objectivity” (Derrida, 
1976, p. 88). Derrida searches an alternative to a philosophy of consciousness and 
intentionality, which “from Descartes to Hegel” apprehend “presence as consciousness, 
                                                
1 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Manuel Batsch.  E‐mail: 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self-presence conceived within the opposition of consciousness to unconsciousness” 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 248). But in his escape from ‘the cogito’, Derrida’s aim is also to 
overcome structuralism. Indeed in Of Grammatology Derrida argues that notions of sign 
and signifier have a fundamental link with Western metaphysic. By using the sign to 
reach objectivity, structuralism limits “the sense of being within the field of presence” 
under “the domination of a linguistic form” (Derrida, 1976, p. 23). In structuralism’s 
view objectivity becomes what in the object subjects itself to the sign (Safatle, 2011). In 
his criticism of an objectivity defined around reason or defined around linguistic 
structures, Derrida identified Freud as an ally. Derrida finds in Freud’s model of the 
unconscious intentional processes beyond consciousness, which seem to play a part in the 
constitution of objectivity. Contrary to Lacan, Derrida thinks that those unconscious 
processes cannot be apprehended through structuralism. In Derrida’s view, the language 
of the unconscious described by Freud isn’t organized around the notion of sign. To 
describe this language of the unconscious Derrida invents the term psychical writing. 
Thus objectivity would have its roots in “psychical writing”, a language that functions 
beyond the sign and beyond self-presence. This use of Freud comes from a reading that 
Derrida summarized very clearly at the beginning of Freud and the Scene of Writing: 
“Our aim is limited: to locate in Freud’s texts (…) those elements of psychoanalysis 
which can only uneasily be contained within logocentric closure” (Derrida, 1978, p. 249).  
 
It is this aim of Derrida’s in his reading of Freud that I would like to take over under the 
form of a question - the question of what escapes the logos in Freud’s work? I think that 
this question has a great significance beyond the use that Derrida made of it for his own 
researches. My aim is to use this question to understand what is at stake in Freud’s 
metapsychology. I would like to propose that Freud’s metapsychology describes the 
evolution from a mode of thinking that cannot be reduced to the logos towards a verbal 
mode of thinking. According to this hypothesis metapsychology would give a model of 
the genesis of the mental apparatus and its functioning through the cohabitation of two 
modes of thinking: a primary hallucinatory mode of thinking and a secondary verbal 
mode of thinking.   
 
Hence, my starting point will be the question of understanding what cannot be verbalized 
in Freud’s work. But this question can be read at two different levels:  
1. The question can be understood at the level of Freud’s model: in Freud’s model of the 
psyche what are the modes of functioning that cannot be expressed through words?  
2. The question can be understood at the level of Freud’s formulation: in Freud’s writings 
what is not exclusively formalized under a verbal form?  
 
The two aspects of the question are in fact linked. It is precisely because Freud identified 
mode of functioning of the psyche that are non-verbal, that he felt the need to theorize 
them under a non-exclusive verbal form. However in this paper I will deal with the two 
aspects of the questions separately.  
 
Firstly I will try to show how Freud’s metapsychology is an account of a psychical 
apparatus that generates a primitive hallucinatory mode of thinking and a secondary 
verbal mode of thinking.  
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Secondly I will attempt to understand the way Freud’s writing is distorted by the 
modelling of a mode of thinking beyond the logos. 
 
I. To verbalize is to repress 
In the last part of his paper The Unconscious, Freud proposed that the character of 
strangeness attributed to schizophrenic symptoms in comparison with symptoms found in 
transference neurosis comes from the schizophrenic’s use of words (p. 200). Words that 
compose the speech of the schizophrenic are used in the hallucinatory grammar of 
dreams: the primary psychical process made of condensations and displacement. Hence 
the impression of strangeness comes from the hybrid nature of the schizophrenic 
language that hallucinates words or, to use Freud’s metapsychological code, that treats 
words-presentation like thing-presentation. In “schizophrenia object-cathexes are given 
up” but “the cathexis of the word-presentation is retained” (Freud, 1915c, p. 201) and 
therefore words seem invaded by an unconscious mode of functioning. These 
‘schizophrenic’ utterances or the way “the dream-work occasionally treats words like 
things” lead to the idea that “the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of 
things plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious 
presentation is the presentation of the thing alone” (Freud, 1915c, p. 201)  
 
This conception of the system unconscious populated by ‘thing presentations’ functioning 
in a hallucinatory mode of thinking goes way beyond a reductionist hermeneutic view of 
the unconscious. A hermeneutic model would reduce the unconscious to a container of 
hidden meanings: the unconscious understood as a psychic store of repressed mental 
contents that would be accessible only through the analytical process. Against such a 
view Freud’s papers on metapsychology of 1915 present the unconscious as a system that 
generate a hallucinatory mode of thinking. At the core of the description of this 
unconscious mode of thinking is to be found the paradoxical notion of ‘unconscious 
presentation’. The German word for ‘presentation’ is ‘Vorstellung’. In the standard 
edition James Strachey has translated it by ‘idea’ or by ‘presentation’. In this paper I will 
translate ‘Vorstellung’ only by ‘presentation’, which seems to me more faithful to the 
philosophical origins of the word. Indeed ‘Vorstellung’ is a key concept of Kantian and 
post-Kantian philosophy. Ola Anderson pointed out the possible influence that the notion 
of ‘mechanic of presentation’ developed by Johann Friedrich Herbart may have had on 
Freud (Anderson, 1962, p. 224). But even more that Herbart it is from Franz Brentano 
that Freud took on the notion of presentation and more generally the philosophical 
assumption “that every mental state can be analyzed into two components”: a 
presentation and its charge of affect (Wollheim, 1991, p. 35). In Brentano’s view a 
‘presentation’ is not a psychical content, not the idea derived from an object but the 
perception of the object in its actuality: the ‘presentation’ is not the colour but the vision 
of the colour (Merleau-Ponty, 1956, p. 1293). This understanding of presentation remains 
empirical since a presentation is the outcome of the world as perceived by the senses. 
Brentano’s concept of presentation prefigures much more Husserl’s phenomenology than 
Freud’s metapsychology. Indeed Freud used the concept of ‘presentation’ in a completely 
original way that led him to this specifically Freudian notion of ‘unconscious 
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presentation’2: not a deeply buried memory trace but a mental processes of a different 
nature. A mental process that is not a perception but a transformation of the object and 
whose functioning draws the outlines of psychical reality. Freud’s metapsychological 
texts propose a “fiction” that describes the genesis of the structure and function of the 
mental apparatus. In this fiction “at the beginning of our mental life we did in fact 
hallucinate the satisfying object when we felt the need for it” (Freud, 1917, p. 231). 
Hence according to Freud, the hallucinatory perception of reality that appears in dreams 
or in hypnosis is also the way through which psychic life begins and what “once 
dominated waking life, while the mind was still young and incompetent, seems now to 
have been banished into the night (…). Dreaming is a piece of infantile mental life that 
has been superseded” (Freud, 1900, p. 567).3 Through this primary hallucinatory mode of 
thinking a biological need is transformed into a psychical wish. The mnemic image 
linked with the object subjectively perceived in ‘the experience of satisfaction’ of a need 
is reinvented under the form of a presentation in the hallucinatory experience of the wish. 
As a consequence, psychical reality must be distinguished from the subjective perception 
of material reality. Jean Laplanche proposed to name the latter ‘psychological reality’ 
(Laplanche, 1993, p. 77). Freud usually distinguishes two levels of reality: psychical 
reality and material reality. To add this third level of ‘psychological reality’ clarifies the 
specificity of psychical reality. The ‘object’ belongs to material reality. The subjective 
‘mnemic image’ attached to the perception of the object belongs to psychological reality. 
The ‘presentation’, which is the result of the ‘mnemic image’ reinvented through a 
hallucinatory mode of thinking, belongs to psychical reality. Psychical reality transforms 
the subjective perception of material reality into a hallucinatory unconscious reality. 
What motivates this transformation is not the perception of the external world but this 
psychical force that Freud named the Trieb, the drive. The drive is this force “lying on the 
frontier between the mental and the physical” that put the mind at work (Freud, 1905, p. 
168). Thus with the notion of ‘thing-presentation’ that results from a hallucinatory act of 
creation, Freud described a “psychical writing” that functions beyond consciousness, 
beyond self-presence. Psychical reality is the outcome of this “psychical writing”: the 
outcome of a hallucinatory mode of thinking that escapes consciousness.  
 
The knowledge drawn upon by Freud from dream, infancy and madness demonstrates the 
hallucinatory core of the psychic apparatus. The first kind of mental process is the 
unconscious mental processes. In Freud’s metapsychological account, in the beginning 
was the unconscious, primary consciousness being reduced to sense organ monitoring the 
psychical qualities of pleasure and unpleasure: it “is probable that thinking was originally 
unconscious (…) and that it did not acquire further qualities, perceptible to 
consciousness, until it became connected with verbal residues” (Freud, 1911, p. 221). A 
mode of thinking of consciousness emerges from a verbal mode of thinking: the capacity 
for an idea to be connected with verbal presentation “whose residues of quality are 
                                                
2 Freud  takes over major philosophical  concepts  in a  curious way:  as  if he was making  illegitimate  children  with  the  philosophers  from  whom  he  borrows concepts.  
3 Thus a dream is not only a way to reveal repressed wishes through its analysis but also an expression of the most primitive way of thinking.   
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sufficient to draw the attention of consciousness to them and to endow the process of 
thinking with a new mobile cathexis from consciousness” (Freud, 1900, p. 617). 
 
I would like to put forward the hypothesis that this verbal mode of thinking specific to 
consciousness covers and hides the hallucinatory mode of thinking specific to the system 
unconscious. I propose to think of repression in the light of this hypothesis. In his paper 
on Repression Freud indicated, “repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present 
from the beginning, and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred between 
conscious and unconscious mental activity” (Freud, 1915b, p. 147). Since conscious 
mental activity is characterized by a verbal mode of thinking, Freud’s statement can be 
rewritten: “repression cannot arise until the acquisition of a verbal mode of thinking”.4 
Hence primal repression: the first phase of repression, “which consist in the psychical” 
representative of the drive “being denied entrance into the conscious” corresponds to 
thoughts that cannot be connected with verbal presentations and as a consequence these 
thoughts exist only under a hallucinatory form. 
 
A primitive hallucinatory mode of thinking and a secondary verbal mode of thinking 
cohabitate in the human psyche, but those two modes of thinking are not in a one-to-one 
correspondence. I propose that the censorship exercised by primal repression is not a 
matter of moral but rather the outcome of the irreducibility between two modes of 
thinking: because of the limits of language, some thing-presentations are caught in a 
hallucinatory mode of thinking. Presentations that cannot be expressed in the language of 
consciousness establish in the mental apparatus ‘fixations’ of very primitive thoughts - 
primitive not only because of the hallucinatory mode of thinking that produced them but 
also because of the bodily aspects of these thoughts. Infantile fixations in the unconscious 
are hallucinations produced by the anus, the mouth, the genitals and any regions of the 
body that can operate as an erotogenic zone. The various libidinal stages would 
correspond to the erotogenic zones through which thing-presentations are hallucinated. 
The infant would create presentations from memory traces of the external objects through 
specific erotogenic parts of its body. Hence the hallucinatory mode of thinking is closely 
linked with infantile sexuality because it is produced from parts of the body that are 
capable of producing sexual excitations. The connection between the primitive 
hallucinatory mode of thinking and infantile sexuality has also an exogenous origin. 
Through the care carried by the adult, the infant also receives elements of the adult’s 
sexuality. Not only a set of erotogenic stimulus (made of rubbings, of quivering, of 
smells, of warmth…) but also, in a more enigmatic way, the infant receives something of 
the conscious and unconscious fantasies through which the adult invests his/her own 
body. The hallucinatory presentations created from parts of the adult’s body involves in a 
complex way the different stimuli and messages received from the adult.5 The infant 
                                                
4 Before  this  stage  the  defensive mechanisms  have  a  hallucinatory  nature  that have been first explored by Melanie Klein.  
5 Jean Laplanche has developed his general theory of seduction from the idea that the  sexual  message  originating  in  the  adult  is  an  enigmatic  message  for  the infant.  With  this  theory  Laplanche  proposes  an  account  of  the  origin  of  the psychic apparatus and the drives, starting from the adult‐infant relation.  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creates presentations hallucinated on the body through auto-erotism. In such a way that 
auto-erotism is paradigmatic of the hallucinatory mode of thinking. Infantile sexuality, 
which is at the core of the hallucinatory mode of thinking is incompletely transposed in 
the verbal mode of thinking. The auto-erotic activity bears witness to the incapacity of a 
verbal mode of thinking to link sexual thing-presentations to word-presentations. It is 
because some presentations of infantile sexuality are fixated under a hallucinatory form 
that the sexual drive is so to speak ‘obliged’ to behave auto-erotically at first. The 
hallucinatory mode of thinking is performative, what is thought is created:        
“unconscious processes (…) equate reality of thought with external actuality, and wishes 
with their fulfilment (Freud, 1911, p. 225). Thing-presentations created by the 
hallucinatory mode of thinking generate a reality: the psychical reality. Hence those 
presentations have a psychical truth-value. For that reason the presentations produced by 
the hallucinatory mode of thinking are similar to the suggestions that the hypnotized 
receives from the hypnotist. The state of hypnosis put forward a hallucinatory mode of 
thinking and the hypnotized understands the messages from the hypnotist as orders. It is 
as if at the centre of the self, was to be found a hypnotist who produces suggestions. 
Except that this hypnotist who sits at the core of the self would use the enigmatic 
language of unconscious presentations. 
 
Presentations that exist only under a hallucinatory form create a terrifying world in which 
thoughts are omnipotent. Unconscious presentations of infantile sexuality are like 
suggestions experienced on the one hand in a hallucinatory way on the body through 
auto-erotism. On the other hand infantile sexuality is experienced in the language as an 
eternal quest for meaning, which is expressed with such an acute intensity in children’s 
sexual curiosity that Freud “considered giving this epistemophilic urge the status of a 
separate drive” (Temperley, 2005, p. 62). An effect of this curiosity that motivates the 
child to discover answers in language is to hide the hallucinatory nature of the sexual 
wish. In the same way one of the functions of masturbatory scenarios built by the adult is 
to create a meaning that covers the hallucinatory noise of the sexual wish. The psychical 
apparatus generates: a hallucinatory mode of thinking whose characteristic is to be 
performative and a verbal mode of thinking whose characteristic is to bring meaning. 
What comes first is the demand of the unconscious wish that result from the hallucinatory 
mode of thinking. Meaning is brought secondarily in the après-coup of the hallucinatory 
wish as a way to hide the hallucinatory nature of the wish. In this perspective one of the 
psychical functions of verbal language is to produce meaning that would, in the après-
coup, conceal the hallucinatory nature of wishes. I propose to understand this masking 
function of verbal language as a repression après-coup, an ‘after-repression’.   
 
A metapsychological perspective has revealed a system unconscious that does not work 
on the mode of the logos: a system unconscious understood not as a receptacle of hidden 
meaning but rather as a creator of illusions. Illusions generated by thing-presentations 
created through a hallucinatory mode of thinking. I propose to think of repression as the 
outcome of the superimposition between this hallucinatory mode of thinking and the 
verbal mode of thinking of consciousness. Primary repression results from the 
irreducibility between the hallucinatory mode of thinking and the verbal mode of thinking 
and as a result some presentations are fixed in the system unconscious. It would be 
around these fixations that we hallucinate reality subjectively perceived. The meaning 
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produced by verbal thoughts would conceal those hallucinations from consciousness. 
Verbal language generates meanings as an après-coup of a hallucinatory psychical 
reality. Meaning produced by consciousness is in the après-coup of unconscious wishes. 
Derrida identified this aspect of Freud’s model and used it against an objectivity that 
would be subjected to a metaphysic of presence. In fact the repressive function of the 
logos in Freud would rather open the possibility of an objectivity of the absence. The 
performative aspect of the hallucinatory mode of thinking and the enigmatic nature of the 
unconscious presentations mean that unconscious wishes open up a breach in the subject. 
Quest for meaning would rather consist in a perpetual race behind this absence that 
unconscious wishes open up in the self: “signified presence is always reconstituted by 
deferral, nachträglich, belatedly, supplementarily: for the nachträglich also means 
supplementary” (Derrida, 1978, p. 266). I believe that Derrida formed his alliance with 
Freud around a conception of the logos that is not in the field of presence: logos as 
marked by the après-coup – logos as secondary to an enigmatic psychical writing,6 that I 
have tried to define in this paper as a hallucinatory mode of thinking.  
 
II. A metapsychological writing 
The idea that meaning generated by verbal language achieves a repressive function is not 
only a theoretical one. It has, in fact, a very direct application in the analytical practice. 
The fundamental rule of the psychoanalytic cure: the rule of free association, “which lays 
it down that whatever comes into one’s head must be reported without criticizing it” 
(Freud, 1912, p. 107) is a method to verbalize beyond the logos. Likewise on the side of 
the analyst this unusual way to listen, which consist in not directing the attention to 
anything particular, the so-called ‘evenly suspended attention’ is a way to listen beyond 
conscious meaning. The psychoanalytic technique endeavours to trap verbal language in 
order to bypass its repressive function. The aim of this technique is to generate a dialogue 
that challenges the repressive aspect of verbal meaning. As a consequence the defence 
mechanisms that rest on verbal narratives are somewhat thwarted by the analytical 
framework. Therefore more primitive defence mechanisms may manifest themselves in 
the analysis.  
 
These primitive defence mechanisms - of which Freud gave an outline: “reversal into the 
opposite or turning round the subject’s own self” (Freud, 1915b, p. 147) - are of a 
hallucinatory nature. I think that these hallucinatory mechanisms of defence appear on the 
analytical scene through what Freud had described in his letter to Groddeck as “the hubs 
of treatments”: resistance and transference.  
 
Firstly I will try to show how hallucinatory mechanisms can manifest themselves through 
resistance to the rule of free association. The stroke of genius of The Interpretation of 
Dreams is to establish “in the face of ‘scientific’ prejudices” that manifestations of the 
unconscious - dream, parapraxis, symptoms, free association – have significance: they 
                                                
6 One of Derrida’s axioms is that a form of writing is a requirement for speech and that  it  is  precisely  the  “repression”  of  this  primary  form  of  writing  that constitutes the origin of western philosophy as a branch of knowledge.  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obey the laws of the primary process, “which constitute a primary mode of functioning of 
the logos” (Laplanche Pontalis, 1973, p. 306). A purpose of the analytical framework is 
to give birth to such productions of the unconscious in order to decipher them. Hence the 
utopia of free association would consist in a speech guided by the grammar of the 
primary process: a kind of spoken dream. The rebus constituted by this ideal chain of free 
association could then be interpreted. In the reality of the practice a constant flow of free 
associations is an ideal never attained. The speech of the one who free-associates comes 
up against more or less explicit resistances. I think this resistance to free associations is 
the expression of psychical phenomena that are not understandable through the primary 
process. The primary process describes the functioning mechanism of unconscious 
presentations. What I named hallucinatory mode of thinking describes the hypothetical 
psychical act that creates unconscious presentations from memory traces. Because this 
hallucinatory mode of thinking is partly a bodily mode of thinking - as it appears in auto-
erotism - unconscious presentations resist being verbalized. Thanks to free association the 
subject reproduces the functioning mechanism of unconscious presentations and the non-
verbal aspects of those presentations can thus appear so to speak negatively: the pattern 
of the resistances to free associations draws the outlines of presentations that are 
‘unrepresentable’ in verbal language. Unconscious phenomena revealed by the 
psychoanalytic practice, which seem irreducible to a verbal expression, resist the primary 
process as for instance: resistance to free associations, failure of the dream or acting out.  
 
I propose that non-verbal phenomena also manifest themselves in the clinic through what 
Freud qualified as “the more specific finding of analytic work” (Freud 1914, p. 112): the 
transference. I think that it is partly because the analytical framework reduces the 
censorship of verbal meaning that the analysand hallucinates the analyst. In transference, 
the meaning of the analyst for the analysand gets lost.7 The analysand creates 
unconscious presentations of the analyst in a similar way to how an infant creates 
unconscious presentations of the world that surrounds him/her.  
 
The transference and the resistance to the cure replay, in the here and now of the analytic 
situation, a mode of thinking that was at the origin of psychical reality. Hence, part of the 
logos gets lost in the analytical encounter. The great specificity of psychoanalytic 
empiricism is to generate clinical phenomena that operate beyond the logos. It is this 
peculiarity of the psychoanalytical phenomena that raises so many questions to both the 
positivist and the hermeneutic tradition. In a way the task of psychoanalysis is not only to 
study those psychical phenomena but also to invent a framework that can describe them. I 
believe that it is this very task that Freud addressed by searching a form of writing that 
                                                
7 As Freud put  it:  “psycho‐analysis does not create  it [transference], but merely reveals  it  to  consciousness  and  gains  control  of  it  in  order  to  guide  psychical processes towards the desired goal” (Freud, 1910, p. 51). Psychoanalysis doesn’t have the monopoly on the phenomena of transference and one experiences it in day‐to‐day  life,  especially  in  situations  of  love.  And  certainly  novels  and  plays have described the many ways through which reality of the language gets lost in love. I believe it would be interesting to think of love as a situation that generates a hallucinatory mode of thinking.  
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would describe psychical events functioning beyond the logos. I propose to call this form 
of writing, paraphrasing Derrida: a metapsychological writing a metapsychological 
writing whose purpose would be to transcribe psychical writing.  
 
Anyone, analyst or analysand, who has tried to write the content of a psychoanalytic 
session, knows how complex an exercise that is. The complexity comes partly from the 
great heterogeneousness of the analytical material in which becomes intermingled: an 
event from the day before, a dream, a type of silence, a fantasy, a certain noise, a distant 
memory and so on… But at a deeper level, I believe it is the nature of some clinical 
phenomena produced by the analytical encounter that explains this difficulty. The 
psychoanalytic practice generates phenomena that contain hallucinatory thoughts using 
the bodily writing of unconscious presentations. Hence to write about an analytical 
session, one needs a writing that could transcribe this antic hallucinatory non-verbal 
mode of thinking. I believe that Freud’s metapsychology is also an attempt to create such 
a writing. In Freud’s metapsychology, what is at stake behind the hypothesis about a 
genesis of the unconscious is also the creation of a conceptual framework to express 
clinical phenomena specific to psychoanalysis. I think that when Freud compared 
metapsychological analogies to scaffolding (Freud, 1900, p. 536) or when he wrote of 
metapsychology as “the theoretical assumptions on which a psycho-analytic system could 
be founded” (Freud, 1917, p. 222, fn 1) he expressed this very issue: the need to create 
conceptual resources to express the non-verbal phenomena that appear in the clinic.8  
 
The exhaustive research of the stratagems Freud invented to write beyond the logos is an 
extraordinarily complex and rich task. Indeed the problem raised by Freud’s 
metapsychological writing goes beyond the difficulty to formalize knowledge about non-
verbal presentation.9 What is at stake is the link between a form of writing and the 
psychoanalytical practice. Hence some aspects of this practice structure this form of 
writing. In the scope of this paper I would like to draw a first sketch of the 
metapsychological writing. In order to do so I will mention two aspects of it that are 
conditioned by the psychoanalytical practice and then two of the main systems used in a 
metapsychological writing. 
 
                                                
8 The  epistemologist  Gilles‐Gaston  Granger  argues  that  this  “conceptual insufficiency” actually constitutes a richness of the psychoanalytic clinic because it  raises  in  a  “radical  way”  the  problem  of  the  transposition  of  a  subjective phenomenon into an objective knowledge (G‐G Granger, 1967). 
9 The idea that verbal language is incapable of communicating the affects is very much present in Nietzsche: “Our true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could not communicate themselves even if they tried: they lack the right words. We  have  already  gone  beyond  whatever  we  have  words  for”  (Twilight  of  the 
Idols,  “Skirmishes of  an Untimely Man” § 26). Patrick Wotling  (2008) used  this very idea to explains the specificity of Nietzsche’s philosophical writing.  
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1. An esoteric writing 
Since a characteristic of psychoanalytic objects is the difficulty to prove their existence, a 
metapsychological writing describes phenomena whose positivist existence remains 
speculative. What makes the existence of psychoanalytical objects so hard to prove 
comes partly from the warning that Freud had addressed to his listeners at the beginning 
of his introduction to psychoanalysis: “The talk of which psycho-analytic treatment 
consists brooks no listener; it cannot be demonstrated” (Freud, 1915-1916, p. 17). 
Psychoanalytic clinical phenomena come from a dialogue that cannot be observed 
without losing its internal truth (Mosès, 2011). Like the phenomena it tries to describe, 
the first traces of a metapsychological writing appeared in the privacy of a dialogue: the 
one of the correspondence between Freud and Fliess. Unlike the neologism 
‘psychoanalysis’ that Freud used for the first time in a scientific publication,10 Freud 
created the word ‘metapsychology’ in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess.11 Freud made up this 
new form of writing in the secrecy of this correspondence and in the intimacy of his self-
analysis. I believe that this esoteric aspect is a first characteristic of Freud’s 
metapsychological writing that is linked with the analytical practice.  
 
2. A writing of the incomplete 
The second aspect linked with the analytical practice that I would like to stress is the 
incompleteness of the project elaborated through metapsychological writing. Firstly 
because metapsychology has constantly to take into account new clinical material. 
Secondly because when clinical material stops being informative, metapsychology is the 
only way to carry further the theoretical reflexion. In his introduction to Freud’s 
metapsychological papers Strachey moans the loss the seven metapsychological papers 
destroyed by Freud: “It is difficult to exaggerate our loss from the disappearance of these 
papers”(Strachey, p. 106). Together with the five existing papers, they would have made 
up a comprehensive metapsychological work.12 Yet I would argue that the project of an 
exhaustive description of metapsychological concepts is not conceivable. When Freud 
speaks of metapsychology as “the furthest goal that psychology could attain” (Freud, 
1925, p. 59) it is, in my opinion, a way to ascribe an asymptotic value to such a goal. In 
the word metapsychology, “meta” is often understood as designating “beyond” the 
consciousness. It has been proposed as well that “meta” stands for “beyond” psychology 
or “beyond” clinical observations (Assoun, 2007). The point I would like to make here is 
that “meta” can also be interpreted as “beyond” completeness. Metapsychology is 
therefore a constant work in progress, a place for exploration, something similar to the 
laboratory of the scientist or the studio of the artist.  
 
                                                
10 In a paper published in March 30, 1896 in the Revue Neurologique 
11  Letter  of  February  13,  1896:  “I  am  continually  occupied  with  psychology  – really metapsychology”. 
12  The  book would  have  been  entitled Zur  Vorbereitung  einer Meta­psychologie 
(Preliminaries to a Metapsychology).   
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3. The three points of view 
In the middle of Freud’s major paper on The Unconscious, arises the definition of the 
metapsychological “way of regarding”: the description of “a psychical process in its 
dynamic, topographical and economic aspects” (Freud, 1915c, p. 181). This definition of 
a “metapsychological presentation” is in fact extremely radical because each of those 
three aspects hits an impossibility which is to be named: a limit of the logos.  
 
Freud built the topographical point of view on the idea of psychical localities, which are 
not determine of in any “anatomical fashion” but rather as the constituents of a “fiction” 
(Freud, 1900, p. 598) to model our mental functioning: the mental (or psychical) 
apparatus. The topographical point of view consists in locating a psychical process in the 
mental apparatus. Precisely because he didn’t base the mental apparatus on any 
anatomical ground, Freud has to invent the geography of the mental apparatus. He cannot 
refer to any anatomical reality and so he has to draw a new map that corresponds to the 
dissection of a concept: the one of the mental apparatus. In order to map a psychical 
process, Freud needs to invent a graphic, such as the graphics that appear in chapter seven 
of The Interpretation of Dreams. From a textual angle that corresponds to the 
replacement of writing by drawing. I propose that the replacement of verbal writing by 
the graphic of a fiction constitutes the topographical limit to the logos.  
 
The dynamic and the economic point of views rest on the ideas of force and energy: 
psychical processes would be the outcome of forces and they would be cathected by 
amounts of energies. These two point of views are inspired by physical sciences: the 
notion of force is at the core of Newtonian mechanics and the one of energy at the core of 
thermodynamics. For that reason many criticisms have been addressed to the dynamic 
and the economic point of view arguing that Freud’s concern with psychical force or 
psychical energy was a scientific anachronism (Gedo, 1977). In particular the fact that the 
medium of psychical force remains unclear and that quantitative changes of psychical 
energy are impossible to measure in a clinical observation have appeared as “the weakest 
element” of a dynamic and economic theory of psychological causations (Kubie, 1947).13 
Against this view I argue that those two points of view are not so much the testimony of 
Freud’s scientism but rather a means to write psychical phenomena in a non verbal way. 
They both lead toward a mathematical formalization of psychical processes in which 
forces could be modeled by vectors and energies by numbers. However, unlike some 
post-Freudian psychoanalytic thinkers such as Lacan or Bion who have proposed 
mathematical approaches of the psyche, Freud never really went through this path. I 
nevertheless believe that he initiated it. When he wrote that the economic point of view 
“endeavours to follow out the vicissitudes of amounts of excitation and to arrive at least 
                                                
13 As  noticed  by  Mark  Cousins  in  his  introduction  of  a  selection  of  Freud’s theoretical papers:  “ Within psychoanalysis  it  is more the  idea of  the economic dimensions and its relation to the drive that has come in for criticism or simply neglect. Faced with the  inexorable progress of measurement within psychology there  has  been  an  increasing  reluctance  to  refer  to  a  quantitative  dimension within psychical life without being able to assign numbers or measured relations to it” (Mark Cousins, Introduction of The Unconscious, Freud, 1915c, pp.  xiv‐xv) 
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at some relative estimate of their magnitude” (Freud, 1915c, p. 181) one feels a numerical 
writing looming on the horizon. And yet “the indefiniteness of all our discussions on 
what we describe as metapsychology (…) due to the fact that we know nothing of the 
nature of the excitatory process that takes place in the elements of psychical systems” 
constrains to operate “all the time with a large unknown factor, which we are obliged to 
carry over into every new formula”(Freud, 1920, pp. 30-31) This unknown factor carried 
in the economic and dynamic description of a psychical phenomena constitutes, I believe, 
the economic and dynamic limit to the logos.   
 
Freud’s transcription of a psychical process into a metapsychological presentation is not 
written exclusively under a verbal form. Along the topographical axis it takes the form of 
a graph and along the economical and dynamic axis it is represented through “formulas” 
that carry over “a large unknown factor”.  
 
4. The Mythology 
In his quest to formalize unconscious psychical determinism, Freud used the Greek 
myths. Already at the time of his self-analysis Freud had raised the hypothesis that 
Oedipus tragedy could seize “on a compulsion which everyone recognises because he 
feels its existence within himself”14. Then throughout Freud’s work, Greek mythology 
seems to furnish his metapsychology with paradigmatic figures, whose evolution could 
be summarized around the succession of three of these mythological figures: Oedipus, 
Narcissus and Thanatos. Oedipus would correspond to the discovery of infantile 
sexuality, Narcissus to the introduction of the concept of narcissism and Thanatos to the 
apparition of the death drive. Greek mythology is a fundamental element of Freud’s 
metapsychological writing. In his endeavours to formalize unconscious presentations the 
logos of a theory of psychological causations is transformed into the pathos of Greek 
mythology.15 Moreover, by writing the subject’s psychical reality through the Greek 
tragedies, Freud gave back a significance to the violence of destiny contained in these 
myths: the determinism of unconscious presentations disguised in the form of destiny. I 
believe that the use of mythology is one of the main solutions Freud found to the problem 
of writing the hallucinatory nature of the unconscious. 
 
Conclusion 
In Character in Fiction a paper given in 1924 before the Cambridge Heretics Society, 
Virginia Woolf proposed a “scientific” reason to explain the appearance of modern 
fiction and that reason was Freud:  
 
                                                
14 Letter to Fliess of October 15, 1897. 
15 Gilles Deleuze  in Proust and Signs  developed  this distinction between pathos and  logos. Deleuze  proposed  a  reading of  Proust  in which  the world of  pathos contrasts “ with the world of logos, the world of hieroglyphs and ideograms with the  world  of  analytic  expression,  phonetic  writing  and  rational  thought” (Deleuze, 1972, p. 108).  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“If you read Freud you know in ten minutes some facts - or at least some possibilities - 
which our parents could not have guessed for themselves: to read Freud was to come 




The new knowledge that made of Freud the catalyst of modernity in literature was of 
course the explicit knowledge of the unconscious. However, even more than the 
unconscious as a concept, I wonder if Freud’s influence on literature might have more to 
do with the transcription of the unconscious in the practice of writing. This idea rests on 
the hypothesis that I have tried to explore here in my paper: the psychoanalytic 
mechanism generates psychical phenomena, which replay in the here and now of the 
analytic situation a hallucinatory mode of thinking that was at the origin of psychical 
reality.  
 
To create a form of writing to describe those psychical phenomena is a challenge for the 
analyst who searches for an epistemological framework in order to make sense of the 
clinical encounter, but it is also a challenge for the writer. I believe that to put the 
language at work in order to create a writing of the psychical reality revealed by the 
analytical cure is one of the great challenge that has arisen for the writers of modern 
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